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2METHODOLOGY
Analysis Plan,
When a DTA worker assesses whether a family's (T)AFDC case will be closed, s/he
decides which one of 67 different codes best describes the reason cash benefits for the household
will be stopped. To carry out the analyses, we sorted all of the 67 codes into clusters of codes
that logically grouped together: Cluster I, Increased Income; Cluster H, Sanctions; Cluster III,
Eligible Persons Moved; Cluster IV, Fraud; Cluster V, Client Request; Cluster VI, No Longer
Eligible; Cluster VII, Other or Multiple Meanings.^ The Appendix displays a description of the
case closing codes in each cluster that provided a basis for our analyses. We used SPSS
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) to calculate the trends in the number and percentages
of case closings from October, 1995 to August, 1997 for each of the clusters mentioned above,
and from October, 1993 to August, 1997 for the category of Earned Income only (a sub-set of
Cluster I, Increased Income). We used four time periods for our analysis of earned income case
closings, reflecting the progression of events surrounding the passage and full implementation of
Massachusetts' welfare reform measures. These time periods are: October 1993 to September
1994, former AFDC phase; October 1994 to September 1995, legislative deliberation and
passage phase; October 1995 to September 1996, initial implementation phase; and October 1996
to August 1997, the most recent implementation phase.
Limitations.
• Changes in some codes between 1993 and 1995 limit our ability to make pre- and
post-reform comparisons. New codes were added in 1995 to accommodate the
sanctions that were part of the state's welfare reform plan. Pre- and post-reform
comparisons for this policy brief are limited to increased income due to earnings: These
codes remained the same throughout the entire time period under investigation.
• Some of the case closing codes have multiple meanings. For example. Code 66 has the
^ We initially had an eighth category, "Detennined to be ineligible at the time of applicaticHi," which was
comprised of Codes 56 and 70. These codes are used for instances in which families have ^plied for cash
benefits, but did not receive them. We agreed with the DTA recommendation to eliminate this category ftam the
analysis. We have included only those case closings in which households had actually received cash benefits.
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3following two meanings: (1) Grantee closed due to failure to cooperate with the Child
Enforcement Unit and (2) Case denied, your Medical Report was not completed within the
30 days of its being filed. (For additional examples, please see the Appendix.) All of the
cases closed for multiple meanings and other miscellaneous reasons were grouped into one
category.
• Several case closing codes may be relevant for any one closure. However, DTA
workers are limited to choosing one reason for closing a family's case. For example, a
family may experience an increase in income, and therefore request a termination of their
benefits. Limited to using only one code, a welfare worker may likely close this case using
code 76 (client requested that cash benefits be stopped), rather than code 61 (closing due
to earned income). While more than one code may be relevant, the code chosen for
officially closing a family's case has to be legally defensible.
• Finally, analysis of the case closing data does not provide a detailed picture ofhow
families are actually doing as a result of the termination of their (T)AFDC benefits -
the most important indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of welfare reform. It simply
provides a picture of trends in the reasons that Massachusetts households ojficially lost
(T)AFDC cash benefits.
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4RESULTS
Question 1. Have morefamilies left the welfare rolls since the implementation of welfare
reform as compared with the pre-reform period?
For the entire period under investigation, (October 1993- and August 1997), 4.9% of families
who received AFDC left the welfare rolls each month. For the pre-reform period (October 1993 -
September 1995), 4.6% ofAFDC families left the welfare rolls each month, as compared with
5.1% for the post-reform period (October 1995 - August 1997). This difference is significant.
This indicates that the steady drop in the Massachusetts welfare caseload is attributable to fewer
families receiving benefits, lower percentages of new case openings, and higher percentages of
families leaving the rolls (See Figure 1). However, we found no significant difference in the
percentages of families who left the welfare rolls due to earned income pre and post reform.
Figure 1. (T) AFDC Cases
Average Total Open
Oct '93 to Sep '94 Oct '94 to Sep '95 Oct '95 to Sep '96 Oct '96 to A ug '97
Time Frame
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Question 2. During the periodfrom November 1995 through August 1997, for what reasons
havefamilies' TAFDC cases officially closed?
Between November 1995 and August 1997, a total of 95,654 TAFDC cases were officially closed
for the foUowing reasons (in descending order) (See Figure 2)
:
~ 40% (n= 36,775) of cases were closed due to sanctions
[including non-compliance with procedural requirements (33 %, (n = 31,215); and
non-compliance with behavioral requirements (6 %, n = 5,560)];
~ 24 % (n = 23,056) were closed for increased income
[including earned income (19 %, n = 18,596)];
~ 15 % (n = 14,366) were closed as a result of client request;
~ 1 1 % (n = 10,986) were closed with codes having other or multiple meanings;
~ 8 % (n = 8,013) were closed due to eligible persons moved;
~ 2 % (n = 2,030) were determined to be no longer eligible;
~ 0.5 % (n = 428) were closed due to fraud.
Figure 2: DTA Case Closings Post Reform
(October 1995 to August 1997)
Total number of cases closed (n=95,654)
No longer eligible
Increased income
(n>:23.056)
24%
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Question 3. How do reasonsfor TAFDC case closings in Massachusetts compare between the
initial implementation (October 1995 to September 1996) and most recent implementation
(October 1996 to August 1997) of welfare reform ? '
With few exceptions, the differences in reasons for case closings between these two time periods
(October 1995 to September 1996) and (October 1996 to August 1997) are not significantly
different (See Figure 3). The two categories showing significant change were: non-compliance
with procedural requirements (an increase from 30% to 36%), and multiple meanings/other (a
decrease from 15% to 8%).
Figure 3: DTA Case Closings (October 1995 to August 1997)
Post WeHar«-Reform Anatysis
Percentage of
cases closed
3&3%
Oct "95 to Sep "96 nzS0,7S7
Oct '96 to Aug "97 n=44.a97
5.6%
,
2.5%
1-7% 0.49%
0.41%
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hon oempiiM: kiorMiCd CNmrt r*^uMt BlgM*p*r«en« MuWpt* Wct>-ooinpllmo«: Noleng*r Fraud
preoadural Inoen* movad MMNnga/Olttar bahavtoral algM*
Category of closing
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Question 4. How do reasonsfor (T)AFDC case closings due to earned income in Massachusetts
compare overfour time periods: theformerAFDCphase; the legislative deliberation andpassage
phase; the initial implementation phase; and the most recent implementation phase?
The earned income category is especially important: The primary goal of the State's welfare reform
effort is to promote families' economic self-sufficiency, and to decrease their reliance on public
assistance for meeting their basic needs. Our analysis indicates that in the first two time periods, 22%
of cases were closed due to increased earned income, while in the third and fourth time periods, they
accounted for only 20% and 19% of case closings (respectively) (See Figure 4). This decrease is not
significantly lower, DTA suggests that this decrease may be the result of the higher income disregard
allowed within the current welfare regulations that enables recipients to continue to receive cash
benefits while earning income at levels that, in pre-reform days, would have precipitated a termination
of cash benefits. This fact alone could explain why the percentages of cases closed due to earned
income decreased during the post-reform period.
Figure 4: Percentage of DTA Cases
Closed due to Earned Income
M
0)
(0
(0O
O Q)
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C
u
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40%
20%
0%
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(n=12,367) (n=13,090) (n=9,945) '97 (n=8.651)
Time Frame
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Decreasing welfare caseloads receives prominence in the media as an indication that the nation's
welfare reform experiment is working. A more important indicator of success is the extent to which
families make the transition from welfare to work, while earning enough to meet their basic needs and
parent their children well While welfare reform was initially passed with the expectation of having more
families leave the welfare rolls to go to work, our findings indicate that this goal is yet to be realized.
On the national front, the welfare caseload has dropped by 24% since January of 1993 (Tatara,
1997). Opponents of welfare reform explain the drastic decline in caseloads by speculating that the
media portrayal of "get tough" welfare reform policies has played a role in discouraging low-income
parents from applying for benefits, and has exacerbated the long-standing stigma associated with welfare
receq)t in the United States. Receiving welfare has become even more socially unacceptable
(Abramovitz, 1996; Blank, 1997).
In Massachusetts, the total welfare caseload has steadily declined over the past five years,
mirroring a downward trend in the unemployment rate for this same period (See Figure 5)^
Figure 5
Massachusetts Monthly Welfare Caseloads and Unemployment Rates
July 1988-October1997
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Source: DTA Family Caseload data. UDemployment data from Massachusetts Division of Employmerrt and Training and
are seasonally adjusted.
^ Prepared by Randy Albelda, economist at the University of Massachusetts Boston.
MASSACHUSETTS (DAFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST 1997 May 15. 1998
9A DTA study, conducted for the months of December 1996 and January 1997, found that more
than half of the families who lost welfare benefits in those months were working (DTA, 1997).
While we questioned the methodology DTA used to reach this finding, we had expected that the
percentages of cases closed due to earned income would have increased during the post-reform
period, given the State's current booming economy. Instead, we found that only about one in five
cases were closed for this reason during both the pre-reform and post-reform periods. Our
findings are similar to those reported in a recent General Accounting Office study of
Massachusetts' and other states' welfare reform measures (GOA, 1997). The GAO reported that
only 23% of Massachusetts families leaving welfare had earned income once cash benefits
stopped.
The discrepancies in DTA and our study findings (50% vs. 19%) are due to
methodological differences in sampling strategy and analysis. We utilized only one data source
for analyzing cases closings for the period under investigation, however, we had access to 47
months of DTA data. DTA utilized more data sources than were available for this study (Le.,
case closing codes, client records, case worker and client interviews). However, the analysis
covered only a two month period, and relied in part upon case worker recollections, a
questionable research strategy for the issues under consideration. Additionally, the cases DTA
reviewed included only those families who remained off of welfare for a six month period, and
excluded the 14-17% of cases that get re-opened each month. In contrast, our analysis included
the entire universe of cases that were closed each month.
The most striking finding of our study is that more recipients lose their benefits as a result
of sanctions than for any other reason. In the post-reform period, 40% of the cases were closed
either because of a procedural or behavioral sanction. Sanctions include anything fi"om failure to
complete a monthly income verification report to failure to participate in work requirements.
Similar findings have been cited nationwide. For example, in Maryland, 12% of cases were closed
due to "starting work," while 31% of their cases were closed due to sanctions (Maryland Family
Investment Administration, 1997). Mississippi fared even worse with only 8% of cases closing
because of earnings, and 67% of families losing benefits for failure to comply with program rules
(GAO, 1997). A recently publicized New York study reported that in the first few months after
MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST 1997 May 15, 1998
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families in New York City lost welfare benefits, only 29% found full-time or part-time jobs.
However, it should be noted that families earning as little as $100 over a three month period were
considered employed (Hernandez, 1998). Finally, researchers in Wisconsin investigated income
trends among 7,502 single parents for one year after leaving the Milwaukee welfare rolls, and
found that only 10% of these parents were able to sustain income above the poverty level, and
that 55% returned to AFDC within that year (Pawasarat, 1997).
Findings from these studies strongly suggest that very low-income families may not be
able to sustain employment at wages high enough to meet their basic needs, without periodic
access to publicly-fimded income support. In Massachusetts, a family of three would need an
income of $27,500 a year to afford housing at the lowest fair market rent rates, spending no more
than 30% of their income on rent (Stone, 1997). To reach this income level, a single mother
would need to be working full time at a job that paid $14.30 per hour, almost three times the
minimum wage. A family of three, subject to time limits on welfare receipt, becomes ineligible
for TAFDC benefits when the parent earns more than $5.70 per hour from ftill-time work,
yielding a yearly income of only $1 1,856, not enough to pay for housing and for other basic
necessities of life.
The only category of case closings that increased during the most recent welfare reform
implementation phase was failure to comply with procedural requirements (from 30% to 36% of
case closings). This increase may be an indication that the consolidation of welfare offices, from
44 in 1995 to 40 at the present time, is creating more access barriers for families. That is,
families in several parts of the State have greater distances to travel for appointments at the local
DTA offices, and more challenging public transportation obstacles to overcome. In addition, if
more families are working while receiving cash benefits, or carrying out their community service
requirement, then taking time to complete the monthly paperwork, transport their children to child
care or school, and keep appointments with their local DTA workers may be a tremendously
difficult feat.
While one goal of welfare reform has been reached (Le., reducing the welfare rolls), our
analysis suggests that the version of welfare reform adopted by Massachusetts may not enable the
MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST 1997 May 15, 1998
11
majority of welfare recipients to move out of poverty. Time limits are looming on the horizon.
That is, non-exempt families who have received welfare for a consecutive 24 month period will
begin to lose cash benefits in December 1998. If welfare reforms are not enabling families to
become financially secure, time limits may be the final precipitating force that plunges the most
vulnerable and poor families further into poverty, exacerbating a full range of social and
community-wide tragedies. All stakeholders in the welfare reform debate want to avoid a range
of potential negative outcomes: additional physical and emotional harms on women and children
forced to stay with violent family members; involuntary separations for other families; increased
loss of housing and subsequent increases in homelessness; negative developmental and health
outcomes for children in these families; and use of homeless assistance, programs, protective
services, correctional systems, emergency medical services, and food pantries as the only fallback
options for families.
In a very real way, welfare reform in Massachusetts is a high stakes, untested social policy
experiment. Time limits have never before been a part of the State's or country's social welfare
system. Three minimal requirements should be integral to the implementation process, and agreed
upon by proponents and opponents of the State's approach to welfare reform. First, the economic
status of every family leaving the welfare rolls should be known, and tracked over time. Case
closing data are one important source of information for tracking the reasons families are losing
welfare benefits. Additional sources of information will need to be utilized to examine how these
families are doing economically over time. Second, families who are working, but are not able to
make ends meet, should continue to receive cash benefits, without a time limit. In addition,
families should be able to obtain education and training with support from the State. Finally,
income support should be available to those families who are unable to work.
MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST 1997 May 15, 1998
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Department of Transitional Assistance Commentary on the
McCormack Institute of Public Affairs Policy Brief:
Massachusetts (T)AFDC Case Closings
October 1993 - August 1997
We appreciate the opportunity to provide this commentary on the McCormack Institute's Policy
Brief: Massachusetts (T)AFDC Case Closings. The Department of Transitional Assistance
(DTA) has been and continues to be in the forefront of investigating cases that leave cash
assistance. Our experience to date is that such a complex issue as the workforce participation of
former TAFDC recipients carmot be adequately answered by using only administrative records,
especially records designed for a quite different purpose.
A. Closing Codes Are Not An Adequate Data Source For Measuring The Workforce
Participation Of Former TAFDC Families.
The main purpose ofDTA closing codes is to provide proper notification to the recipient about
why we are closing their case so that they can remedy the situation that caused the closing or can
appeal the reason. Consequently, as noted in the Policy Brief, "while more than one code may be
relevant, the code chosen for officially closing a family's case has to be legally defensible."
For example, if a worker presents information that the recipient may be working and requests
evidence from the family, which is not forthcoming, we cannot close the case for earnings, even
though we have evidence to that effect. Rather, we must close it for failing to provide a
requested verification. Similarly, if a recipient family chooses not to appear for a scheduled
eligibility review, DTA must close the case for failing to redetermine eligibility. To consider
these two reasons as "sanctions'" is too broad a definition of sanctions. In fact, the family is
given the opportunity immediately to remedy the problem.
We suspect - and our studies confirm - that a substantial number of procedural closings are
really earnings or eligibility related.
B. Historically, Earnings Related Case Closings Have Declined During Good Economic
Times, Regardless Of The Welfare Policy.
The same trend reported in the Policy Brief - slight, non-significant declines in the earnings
related code closings - has been seen before, ironically during the "Massachusetts Miracle". As
the table below shows, earnings related case closings were at their lowest during the October
1984 to September 1986 period, a lime when the AFDC caseload was at (then) historic lows,
when the work program was voluntary, when there were no time limits, and when the economy
was expanding rapidly over several years.
Page 1
Everyone at the time agreed that the decline in the AFDC caseload during the early 1980's was
the direct result of increased employment opportunities for recipients. Yet then, as now, DTA's
closing codes did not reflect such a pattern, primarily because our closing codes are intended to
provide the reason we are acting to close the case and not to track why cases leave assistance.
The data in Table 1 highlight the inappropriateness of using closing codes to measure the work
force participation of former welfare recipients regardless of the extent to which the caseload
decline is through voluntary work participation or through program requirements. Every time the
caseload increased, the earnings related closing code rate also increased. Likewise, three of four
times the caseload decreased , the rate also decreased. While this may be counterintuitive, it has
occurred in similar economic, but quite different programmatic, times.
Table 1:
Trends in Cases Closed for Earnings
October 1982 to September 1987
Compared to
October 1993 to September 1997
Time Period Average Caseload Eamings-Related(%)
October 1983 to September 1984 85,181 20.2
October 1984 to September 1985 84,582 16.7
October 1985 to September 1986 85,801 17.0
October 1986 to September 1987 86,432 18.7
October 1993 to September 1994 104,725 21.76
October 1994 to September 1995 ' ' 957723 22.12
October 1995 to September 1996 83,920 19.50
October 1996 to September 1997 74,270 19.19
C. DTA Is Currently Conducting Studies To Better Understand The Effect Of Welfare
Reform On Families.
Because DTA is concerned about the serious limitations of administrative records and because
wc are strongly committed to assessing, accurately and reliably, the effects of welfare reform on
Massachusetts" low income families, we are regularly conducting follow up studies of case
closings. In the past eighteen months we have conducted three studies of closed cases, are in the
process of conducting a longitudinal study, and are working w ith the Welfare Forum on yet
another.
Wc have conducted three studies of cases that closed for ambiguous reasons, including failing to
xcrifv. failing to complete an eligibility redelerniinalion. clients" request, and others. To better
undersiand what circumstances exist when cases closed and remained closed, we investigated
half of the "ambiguous" closings for a two month period at three different times. Each time the
sample was more than 1,700 cases that closed and remained closed 30 - 60 days later.
Our findings consistently indicate that half of the closed cases had earned income, an additional
10% of the closed cases had unearned income (primarily child support) and approximately 1 1%
moved out of state. To demonstrate the inappropriateness of using closing codes exclusively, we
need only look at the actual reasons cases closed for failing to provide a requested verification;
" 3 1 cases ( 1 6%) had a new job
° 14 cases (7%) had increased earnings
° 1 5 cases (8%) moved out of state
° 23 cases ( 1 2%) had an absent parent return
** 4 cases (2%) received support from family or friend
° 1 9 cases ( 1 0%) received unearned income
° 26 cases (14%) had no eligible children
° 2 cases (1%) had excess assets
** 9 cases (5%) were categorically ineligible
° 3 1 cases ( 1 6%) were in the process of reapplying
° 4 cases (2%) refused to answer
" 2 cases ( 1 %) had another reason, and
° 1 cases (5%) were not able to be contacted.
Virtually none of these constitute a sanction, although each was counted as such in the Policy
Brief
The Department of Transitional Assistance is currently conducting a longitudinal study of cases
that closed during the January through June 1997 period. We are contacting the former recipient
sample at three, six, nine and twelve month intervals and conducting an in-depth interview
regarding their income, family composition, well being, use of other services, transportation and
other aspects of their lives. We expect the results will be available in early 1999.
In summary, DTA remains committed to and actively involved in tracking closed cases to better
understand the often complex effects of welfare reform.
We also would like to identify several oversights in the Policy Brief
° A GAO report is cited as indicating that 23% of Massachusetts families leaving welfare
had earned income when cash benefits stopped. The same GAO report notes that
"Because not all households had to report such income, these percentages are likely to be
understated." (GAO/HEHS 97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination, page 37) Even more
significantly, GAO only examined a very select group of closed cases, specifically only
cases terminated and in closed status for failure to meet the work, teen school or teen
living requirements. In their report, the closed teens were a considerably higher
percentage of the total examined by GAO than they are in the active caseload.
° The Policy Brief makes only scant note of a major policy change - whereby nonexempl
recipients remain eligible for TAFDC at higher earned income levels because of more
generous disregards - that would contribute to a reduction in earnings related closings.
On page seven of the Policy Brief, the authors acknowledge "This fact alone [the increase
Page 3
in the earned income disregard] could explain why the cases closed due to earned income
decreased during the post-reform period."
° In acknowledging the discrepancy between DTA's and the Institute's findings on
earnings related closings, the Policy Brief authors note that they used only a single source
but for a much longer time period - 47 months - while DTA used several sources for a
shorter period. If the data are unreliable and incomplete to begin with, the number of
periods used is inconsequential.
° The Institute's methodology included families that closed and subsequently reopened. In
DTA's studies, more than 20% of closings reopen within 30 - 60 days. Obviously, this
distorts any subsequent calculations and projections to cases that remain closed.
° The Institute's concluding remarks on the "inadequate income levels of former welfare
recipients" seems out of place considering that no data are provided on the subject, and
no such conclusions can be garnered from closing codes.
In summary, Massachusetts remains committed to ensuring that TAFDC recipients are as
prepared as possible for life after- cash assistance ends, and to studying how they are faring
whenever that occurs. We believe that this is a complex problem, and that a superficial analysis
of such a complex problem only distorts the true picture of what is happening under welfare
reform.
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Commentary on the John W. McCormack Institute ofPublic Affairs
A Policy Brief Massachusetts (T)AFDC Case Closings
October 1993 - August 1997
Brenda Farrell & Mary Doyle
Homes for Families
We are pleased to be able to provide commentary on the important work that the
McCormick Institute has done regarding the implications of Welfare Reform on
Massachusetts families. Homes for Families welcomes the opportunity to have accurate
information documenting why families are moving off welfare. So often we read stories in
the paper that do not reflect the stories we hear from the families we witness in our work.
The reasons why families are leaving the welfare rolls, as well as information on where
they go or what happens next, is needed both to evaluate the efficiency of existing
programs and to work for improvement.
The brief, while providing some answers, is a catalyst for many more questions. We will
focus on four of them:
• what is the goal ofwelfare reform, and how are the goals being evaluated?
• why are so many more families losing benefits due to sanctions?
• are there any hidden costs associated with the reduction in rolls?
• why isn t the number of families leaving welfare due to earned income increasing
v^'ith welfare reform?
In the first paragraph of the policy brief it is stated that "Proponents of the reform {welfare
I eform) hoped that the shift in social policy would enable more families to end their
dependence on public assistance and become financially secure." Nothing in the report
findings suggests that financial security for families in Massachusetts is a goal of welfare
reform. Instead, it appears there is one goal, decreasing case loads. The focus on
decreasing case loads and state reports indicating that declining numbers is proof that
policy is working, shows a total disregard for poor families and their children in
Massachusetts. With the objective being decreasing case numbers, not financial security
and stable lives for recipients, it is no wonder that families are victims of procedural and
behavioral sanctions.
Homes for Families is not surprised by the findings regarding the reasons that families'
TAFDC cases were officially closed. Many homeless families and other members of
Homes for Families have reported cases being closed due to unnecessarily cruel sanctions.
TAFDC procedural requirements are often times consuming, confusing and difficult to
comply with. In addition, homeless families are under a great deal of stress, the majority
of families have become homeless due to crisis in their lives, including domestic violence
and divorce. Parents, most often women, are dealing with the effects of the crisis, all the
while trying desperately to cope and help their children through the often horrific
experience of homelessness.
For families living on the edge, struggles are complicated by monthly reporting, visits to
appointments at scattered welfare offices, (often without transportation) and seemingly
endless documentation requirements that would be difficult for any TAFDC recipient to
fulfill. It is especially overwhelming for those facing the compounded issues of
homelessness and hopelessness. It is understandable why numerous families are being
sanctioned for non-compliance with the many rules and regulations.
The significant change in case closings due to non-compliance with procedural
requirements raises a series of questions that need to be answered as we assess the success
or failure of Massachusetts welfare reform legislation. First, why are more families being
sanctioned? Is compliance with procedural requirements becoming more and more
difficult? What happens to the families that have been removed fi^om the rolls due to non-
compliance with procedural requirements? Are the 14 - 17% of reopened monthly cases
families simply reapplying and complying with the procedural requirements that closed
their cases? How quickly does this happen and what happens to the children and parents
while they deal with the bureaucratic nightmare of applying for TAFDC?
While the TAFDC roll shrink we question whether there are any increases in rolls of other
social service programs Is the number of families applying for emergency assistance (EA)
increasing? It would seem that families who are losing their only source of income are at
greatest risk of becoming homeless. The Department of Transitional assistance does not
keep track of the number of families that apply for EA shelter and are denied, they only
count those who receive it. Given the high cost of sheltering a family as compared to the
relatively low cost of providing a TAFDC grant for the same family one would have to
wonder why this is not being tracked?
The families who struggle to overcome poverty and the shame associated with welfare are
constantly barraged by hostility from the media, society and the Department of
Transitional Assistance. The statistics provided by the brief showing a less than 1% case
closings due to fraud proves that families on TAFDC are not those portrayed in the press,
frauds ripping off the system, living a live of ease. Families on TAFDC are barely making
ends meet. This authenticates our belief that families on welfare are using TAFDC grants
for what they were originally designed for, as a temporary means of support for families in
crisis.
The disturbing finding that there has been little change in the number of case closings due
to earned income in the wake of welfare reform highlights the need to refocus the supports
to families on TAFDC rather than ending benefits. There is often a mismatch between
available jobs that pay a livable wage and the skill level ofthose making the transition off
public assistance. With no education or training to close the gap, recipients are locked in
entry level jobs with no future, with a potential of long-term cycling between work and
public assistance. It's time to think about how to help families transition, not from welfare
to work and back again, but from welfare to financial security.
With the constant struggle to survive, it is difficuh for a family to comply with the
seemingly endless requirements and rules simply to remain poor. The McCormick Institute
policy brief asks a series of important questions relevant to the development of long term
solutions to poverty, homelessness and family self-sufficiency in our Commonwealth. The
policy brief provides us with needed data which will enable us to continue to advocate for
the supports that families have repeatedly informed us they need. These supports are
needed to obtain solutions, not the bureaucratic, systematic elimination of benefits to
children and parents. Education, job training, safe affordable child care, affordable
housing, transportation, and the access to jobs that pay a living wage are the answers to
the often asked question "How does a family on welfare make the transition from welfare
to work''".
We need to continue to ask more questions and search for the answers. How can the
children in Massachusetts reap the benefits of a sound economy? How can we improve
TAFDC so families are moving to jobs paying living wages, not being sanctioned for non-
compliance with a myriad of regulations? How can we make conclusions regarding the
success of welfare reform when we don't know where families go next- financial security,
return to welfare, or other state programs? Economic independence is a goal for all of us.
Our public policy should focus on the long term stability of families and communities. The
focus of welfare reform needs to change from the numbers game and poor public policy to
focusing on living wage jobs, and financial security for families in Massachusetts.
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COMMENTARYONA POLICY BRIEF: MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS
Randy Albelda
for the Boston Area Academics ' Working Group on Poverty
The McCormack Institute's paper on case closings is a welcome addition to discussion on
welfare reform in Massachusetts. Their detailed look at the closing codes for families leaving
welfare sheds important light on a dimly lit subject. The policy brief highlights three very
important insights into the way welfare reform is proceeding in Massachusetts. First, it points to
an implementation system that is far too reliant on closing cases.as punishment for not meeting
procedural and behavioral requirements. Second, the data point to a low percentage of people
leaving welfare for earnings. Third, the McCormack Institute's study raises larger questions
about the type of information needed to assess the efficacy of welfare reform as well as raise
serious questions about the way the Department of Transitional Assistance collects and interprets
information about the impacts of Massachusetts' welfare reform. We discuss these three issues
separately below.
WELFARE BYSANCTION
The finding that two out of every five case closings is due to behavior or procedural non-
compliance gives us tremendous pause. Even if the cases closed due to missing a reporting
deadline or a meeting with a caseworker are reinstated soon after, there is still good reason for
concern. Families whose cases are closed, even if due to procedural reasons, are without their
primary source of income when their case is closed. Virtually all research on welfare use
indicates that people turn to TAFDC because they are poor, almost always in crisis, and do not
have stable income from families or the labor market. Many families receive TAFDC because
adults face barriers to employment stemming from domestic violence and mental and physical
disabilities. The DTA has not released data on the characteristics of those with cases closed, so
there is no way to know if non-compliance is a willful act of negligence or irresponsibility. There
is good reason to believe that recipients do not make meetings with caseworkers or fill out the
proper forms for other reasons: because of their inability to cope with many, complicated, and
seemingly irrational rules; because appointments were rescheduled at a time clients could not
come; or due to the closing of some DTA offices, making another trip to fill out another form
was too difficult.
We know that in its implementation of welfare reform the DTA is relying heavily on the use of
sanctions. So much so, that the department drew the attention from the General Accounting
Office (GAO), in their report States Early Experiences with Benefit Termination. The GAO
looked at Massachusetts because it was one of the three states with the highest degree of benefits
termination. In their report, based on a review of the 1 ,969 case closings due to sanctions as of
Dec. 3 L 1996, they found:
of the families whose cases were originally closed, 32. 1 percent were reopened, either
because families were indeed eligible and had been incorrectly sanctioned, or because
they corrected the problem which had led to case closure (p. 34);
of those families staying off the rolls, 74.4 percent did not continue to receive food
stamps and 41.5 percent did not continued to receive Medicaid, even though it would
appear that they should have been entitled to both (p. 43);
of the families located after being cut off, 23 percent were earning wages (p. 38). Of
those who were earning wages, the average monthly wage was $540.00, still well below
the poverty level. They found that families are leaving without receiving the supports
entitled to them, such as health C2ire and child care subsidies.
Members of our group are very active in research, educational and organizational efforts
conceming welfare reform in Massachusetts, especially in the Boston area. We often come into
contact with recipients, advocates, researchers in the field, and caseworkers. Overwhelmingly,
the anecdotal evidence we hear is that the DTA is conducting welfare reform by sanction and
intimidation. We take a closer look at this issue in a report fi-om the Academics' Working Group
on Poverty called Bad Timing: An Analysis ofMassachusetts' Welfare Time Limits. Vicky
Steinitz' recently released report documents human rights abuses. Stories abound, at community
meetings and public "speak outs," about increases in fi-equency of redetermination hearings,
forced and unexpected lectures by local office administrators regarding the necessity to get a job,
any job, and simple misinformation and conftision in the offices are common. Anecdotally, we
have reports that harassment has increased leading to women leaving the system in such distress,
that they are not even being told about the options for continuing child and health care that exist,
as suggested by the GAO study. We hear stories of increases in misinformation from workers,
who admit to being ill informed and overwhelmed by new rules. We hear too that the new rules
leave caseworkers less and less able to respond sensitively to individual client situations.
If welfare reform has created in increase in the numbers of families being sanctioned or
intimidated off welfare, even for a month, that means families are without income when they
should not be. This outcome is bad for these families, their community, and violates the stated
goals of welfare reform. The data in this report signals that welfare reform implementation,
especially what is happening to families leaving because of sanctions, deserves a closer look.
WHO'S WORKING?
A second important finding in this report is the surprisingly low percentage of case closings due
to earnings. There are two ways to interpret this finding. One way is the obvious: Welfare
reform has not improved the percentage of people leaving welfare for paid emplo> ment.
Alternatively, and perhaps correctly, is exactly as the DTA suggests the low percentage leaving
for eamings could reflect the success of increasing the earnings disregard. That is, people are
staying on the rolls longer than before welfare reform because they are eligible longer
when employed. Both explanations are plausible. But in both cases, the finding points to
problems in welfare reform in Massachusetts Clearly, if the small percentage of case closings
(no more than 20%) due to increased eamings is because people are leaving welfare without
finding jobs, then one important goal of welfare reform is a failure. If the lack of change in
closings due to increased eamings is the resuh of families staying on longer because recipients
can now mix eamings and TAFDC more effectively than prior to reform, this is very good news.
but it will be very short lived because of the strict time limit for non-exempt recipients. Those
who are indeed in jobs, combining earnings and welfare, only have 24 months out of 60 to
receive TAPDC and then they are cut off completely. After December 1, 1998 — when time
limits take effect — we can expect to see the number of case closings due to earnings fall only to
replaced by case closings due to exhausting the time limits.
Which one of the two scenarios is likely taking place? No one knows for sure until there is some
independent research done on those leaving the welfare rolls. However, research on employment
records of those leaving the rolls in other states with similar provisions to Massachusetts, as
the McCormack Institute's policy brief points out, is not very encouraging.
WHAT WENEED TOKNOWAND WHO CAN TELL US
The McCormack researchers and the DTA both argue that the data on case closings are limited.
And in many ways, this study raises more questions than it answers. Why are the case closings
due to procedural sanctions so high? Are they higher now than before welfare reform? How
long are sanctioned families without income? Why isn't the percentage leaving welfare due to
earnings higher after welfare reform than before?
This policy brief points to the importance of independent research in evaluating the effects of
welfare reform. To date, much of the "formal" information about those leaving welfare in
Massachusetts has been provided by the Department of Transitional Assistance, often through
press releases. In those releases, the DTA claims that a substantial proportion of cases (about
1/2) are closed because of earnings which the DTA argues that this suggests welfare reform is
"working." However, the data as analyzed here by independent researchers, suggests a very
different picture of the efficacy of Massachusetts welfare reform. The differences between the
two analysis are not merely the result of a methodological squabble. The differences point to
problems inherent in allowing the very agency which in part helped write and entirely
administers a program to then evaluate the "success" of that program. It is hard to think of a way
that DTA, or any department of the administration, could objectively evaluate welfare reform and
as such should not be asked or trusted to do so. That is not to say the DTA should not be
involved in the evaluation process. Clearly they have a vital role in providing input in and access
to data collection, and just as the McCormack researchers have done, the DTA should read and
comment on evaluations of Massachusetts welfare reform.
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The FoUcy Brief by the McCormack Institute is the first and only academically
rigorous and independent examination of any data relating to welfare reform in
Massachusetts. As such, it is a most welcome first step towards analyzing welfare reform
in the state.
Unfortunately, the case closing data which the Policy Brief analyzes only allow
conclusions about differences in the distribution of case closing codes before and after
welfare reform. Much more research is needed to assess the impact of welfare reform on
Massachusetts famiUes.
Five issues raised by the Pohcy Brief merit further comment. First, the PoUcy
Brief highlights the lack of research in Massachusetts on welfare reform impacts, but DTA
is not conducting any studies of welfare reform impacts and is no longer even making the
case closing data available to the public. Second, the strikingly high and increasing
percentage of procedural closings suggests that welfare reform is not working as intended
Third, it is important to be clear that the PoUcy Brief does not support a conclusion that
the caseload decline is attributable to welfare reform or would not have occurred in the
absence of welfare reform. Fourth, the fact that there has been no increase in the
percentage of cases that are closing because of earnings raises questions about whether
welfare reform is achieving its intended goals. And finally, as highlighted by DTA's
comments on the impact of improved treatment of earnings, time limits will force families
off welfare at low earnings levels which currently qualify them for welfare supplements.
We discuss each of these issues below.
1. The limitations of the Policy Brief highlight the need for more research: however,
DTA is no longer making even the case closing data publicly available.
At the time the legislature enacted the state's welfare reform plan most of the
state's provisions conflicted with federal law and could not be implemented without a
federal waiver. DTA sought and obtained federal waivers for most of the state's
provisions. A condition of obtaining the federal waiver was that the state contract with an
independent research entity to evaluate the impacts of the welfare reform initiatives. In
October 1995, before it implemented the welfare reform provisions, DTA agreed to this
condition. However, DTA never issued requests for proposals for a study and no study
was ever undertaken.^
Not only has DTA failed to fund a proper stucfy of welfare reform impacts, but
after the McCormack Institute began analyzing the case closing data, DTA stopped
providing public access to current data of the type on which the report is based. DTA no
longer provides public access to monthly data on case closings categorized by case closing
code, and no longer provides public access to monthly data on sanctions that do not result
in closings, categorized by type of sanction. Thus, even a limited analysis of the type
undertaken by the McCormack Institute is no loiter possible. DTA's refusal to provide
these data, which were routinely collected and made pubhcly available before and after
welfare reform, and which were provided until McCormack began work on the PoUcy
Brief, raises serious questions about DTA's motives in preventing pubUc scrutiny.
2. The most striking finding in the Policy Brief is the increase in procedural closings.
The Policy Brief correctly states that the most striking finding is that more
recipients lose benefits for procedural reasons than for any other reason. Indeed, the
percentage of cases closed for procedural reasons increased from 30% to 36% between the
first and second years after welfare reform was implemented It is unfortunate that the
data compiled in the Policy Brief do not allow a comparison of procedural closings
percentages before and after welfare reform.
Procedural closings, as explained in the Appendix, include failure to file a Monthly
Report form, failure to schedule an eligibihty review, and failure to supply required
verification. Procedural closings are different from sanctions for non-compliance with
behavioral requirements, such as work requirements and teen parent requirements; these
behavioral sanctions actually dropped shghtly, from 6.0% to 5.6% between the first and
second years of welfare reform. For the most part, procedural closing reasons pre-date
welfare reform, whereas the behavioral sanction reasons were adopted as part of the state's
welfare reform plan.^
' In the FY 98 budget, signed into law on July 10, 1998, the legislature created a
commission to hire a professional entity to conduct a study of welfare reform impacts and
appropriated $100,000 for that purpose. The commission has decided to rely on state employees
to conduct the study. As proposed, the study will rely solely on matching existing data sources,
such 2is Department of Revenue quarterly wage records and welfare records. This may produce
useful and important information but cannot provide information about most welfare reform
impacts.
^ Before welfare reform, the caretaker—^but not the entire family—could be sanctioned for
non-compliance with a behavioral requirement. The state's welfare reform statute and the
federal waivers to implement it authorized full-family sanctions for noncompliance with work
requirements and teen parent requirements. Therefore, all of the behavioral sanctions closings
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Both procedural closings and behavioral sanctions punish families with the most
severe barriers to employment. For example, in a recent study of Delaware's welfare
reform program, famiUes most likely to have barriers to self-support, namely those with the
least education and work e:^erience, were most likely to have been subject to sanctions,^
Why have procedural closings increased dramatically after welfare reform's
implementation? The Policy Brief suggests one answen the consolidation of local welfare
offices is creating access barriers for clients. An additional explanation is the increased
and sometimes conflicting demands imposed on welfare recipients that make it
increasingly difficult for recipients to comply. For example, DTA is conducting monthly
in-person reviews of some welfare recipients who are subject to the time limit. Workers
are instructed to send an appointment letter, without any consideration of whether the
appointment time conflicts with previously scheduled activities—^including required work or
community service activities—and without regard to transportation difficulties. K the
recipient fails to keep the appointment, the worker is supposed to close the case using
Action Reason 41, one of the procedural closings. To give an idea of what welfare
recipients experience, imagine you had to meet with an Internal Revenue Service agent
once a montii, at a time arbitrarily scheduled by the agent that interfered with your work
schedule. Further imagine that you do not have access to a telephone during the day to
reschedule the appointment and that you cannot get through on the telephone when you
do manage to get to a telephone. Finally, imagine that you do not have transportation to
get to the appointment. It is not surprising that under comparable circumstances, many
recipients lose eligibility for procedural reasons.
represent an increase over pre-welfare reform closings. Although these closings constitute a
fairly small percentage of total closings, they are nevertheless disturbing. A number of studies
show that full-family sanctions are not helpful in improving compliance with requirements.
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work
Strategies (formerly JOBS) (Oct. 1997); Fein and Karwelt, The ABC Evaluation: The Early
Economic Impacts of Delaware's A Better Chance Welfare Reform Program (Abt Associates,
December 1997). In Utah, 50% of sanctions were determined to be erroneous. Bill Biggs, Utah
Sanctions Revisited, CLASP Update (Nov. 1997). A recent GAO report concludes that in Iowa,
state agency reviewers foimd that in 50% of the czises referred for benefit termination adequate
casework had not been done to determine whether the recipients knew about the proposed
termination and whether barriers to employment had been sufficientiy addressed. Welfare
Reform: States' Early Experiences with Benefit Termination (GAO, May 1997).
^ Fein and Karwelt, The ABC Evaluation: The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware's A
Better Chance Welfare Reform Program (Abt Associates, December 1997). Similarly, sanctioned
families in Minnesota were four times 2& likely to report chemical dependency, twice as likely to
report a mental health problem, twice as likely to report family violence and three times as likely
to report a family health problem. Pavetti, Olson, Nightingale, Duke, Isaacs, Welfare-to-Work
Options for Families Facing Personal and Family Challenges: Rationale and Program Strategies
(Urban Institute, Aug. 1997).
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3. The Policy Brief should not be misread as finding that the caseload decline is
attributable to welfare reform.
There has been a great deal of academic and public discussion about the extent to
which declines in caseload, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, are attributable to welfare
reform as opposed to improvements in the economy or other causes. The draft Policy
Brief says that during the pre-welfare reform period (Oct 1993-Sept. 1995), 4.6% of
AFDC families left the welfare rolls each month as compared with 5.1% during the post-
welfare reform period (Oct. 1995-Aug. 1997). The Policy Brief does not say, and should
not be read as saying, that the increase in the percentage of cases closing each month is
attributable to welfare reform.''
It is also important to keep in mind that to some extent the results are dependent
on how the time periods are constructed For example, the results summarized in the text
do not include the interesting fact that, according to the data presented in Figure 1, the
percentage of the caseload that left the rolls during the year before welfare reform (Oct
1994-Sept 1995) was sUghtly higher than the percentage of the caseload that left the rolls
during tiie first year after welfare reform (Oct. 1995-Sept. 1996). Thus, during the year
before welfare reform, 5.0% of AFDC famihes left the welfare rolls each month, as
compared with 4.9% for the first year after welfare reform. The continued decline in the
caseload during the first year after welfare reform is attributable to a decline in the
percentage of new case openings, from 3.7% during the year before welfare reform to
3.9% during the first year after welfare reform. While for the post-reform period as a
whole (Oct. 1995-Aug.1997), case closings increased as a percentage of the caseload as
compared with the two years preceding welfare reform, the fact that the percentage
decreased during the first year after welfare reform serves as an additional reminder that
aggregate case closing numbers or percentages tell us very httle about the causes of
caseload decline.
4. The fact that the percentage of case closings due to earnings has not increased
raises questions about viiiether welfare reform is achieving its intended goals.
Using DTA's case closing data, the Pohcy Brief concludes that 19% of the cases
closed for earnings during the second year after welfare reform. DTA, using questionable
methodology, recategorized procedural and other case closings as closings with earnings,
and claims that a total of 50% of closings have earnings at the time of closure. Although
DTA's methodology is questionable, DTA is no doubt correct that its closing codes do not
* On the other hand, it is worth noting that the behavioral case closings, which would not
have occurred before welfare reform, could account for much of the increase in the percentage
of families leaving assistance. Because many of these cases reopen, it is not possible to
determine the extent to which these cases contribute to the decline in the caseload.
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accurately reflect all of the cases that close that have earnings.^ In some cases, families
have earnings that do not make them ineUgjble for assistance, but lose eligibility for a
reason unrelated to earnings. Many of these families are eligible for and would continue
to receive a small welfare supplement were it not for sanctions, procedural barriers and the
threat of time limits. In addition, some families have earnings that make them ineUgible
for assistance, but the case closes for another reason.
The Policy Brief finds, and DTA has not questioned, that the percentage of cases
that close because of earnings has remained essentially stable over time. The fact that,
despite the good economy, the percentage of cases that close because of earnings has not
increased is disturbing. First, it suggests that the benefits firom the improved economy are
being offset by a high rate of sanctions and procedural closings, the only categoiy of
closings which has increased. Second, it suggests that welfare recipients are in no better
position than they were before welfare reform to support their families through earned
income despite DTA's well-publicized campaign to move welfare recipients into jobs as
soon as possible.
Finally, DTA has not provided any data or made any claims that families that leave
welfare are better able to stay off welfare than they were in the past Pre-welfare reform
studies showed that about one-half to two-thirds of those who leave welfare with earnings
need to return at a later point.^ Massachusetts has not b^un to address the reasons
families need to return to welfare: low wages, job instability, lack of child care, and job
inflexibility that interferes with family responsibilities. Until these issues are addressed,
poor families will continue to need welfare even if they are barred from receiving it by
time limits or procedural barriers.
5. DTA's suggestion that the decline in the percentage of cases closed for earnings is
the result of higher income disr^ards—^niiile not confirmed by data—highlights the
^ A number of studies before welfare reform determined that between one-half and two-
thirds of all welfare case closings are related to earnings. See, for example, Weeks, Leaving
Public Assistance in Washington State (Washington State Institute for Public Policy, March 1991);
Gritz and MaCurdy, Patterns of Welfare Utilization and Multiple Program Participation Among
Young Women (The Hoover Institution, January 1992); Pavetti, The Dynamics of Welfare and
Work: Exploring the Process by Which Young Women Work their Way off Welfare (John P. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, May 1993); Harris, "Life After Welfare: Women,
Work, and Repeat Dependency" (American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, 1997). Thus, DTA's
claims that 50% cases closings have earnings, if correct, do not show any increase over national
pre-welfare reform studies.
* Blank and Ruggles, "Short-Term Recidivism among Public Assistance Recipients,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 84(2) (May 1994); Pavetti, The Dynamics of Welfare and Work-
Exploring the Process by Which Young Women Work their Way off Welfare (John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, May 1993).
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fact that time limits vpill force families off welfare at low earnings levels.
The Policy Brief concludes that the percentage of cases closed due to increased
earnings decreased slightly, going from 22% in the first two pre-welfare reform periods to
20% in the first post-welfare reform period and 19% in the second post-welfare reform
period DTA suggests that the decline is the result of improved treatment of earnings
which was part of welfare reform.
It is certainly true that improved treatment of earnings allows some recipients to
continue to receive assistance at earnings levels which would have previously made them
inehgible. However, Massachusetts' treatment of earnings is far less generous than some
other states' treatment of earnings under welfare reform. In particular, Massachusetts has
retained (and for some recipients even lowered) gross income ehgibiUty limits which render
a family ineligible even if it would otherwise qualify for benefits after taking into account
deductions from earnings. Thus, a family of tiiree which is subject to the time limit is
inehgible once its gross income exceeds $l,045/month even if it would still be ehgjble for a
small supplemental grant after taking into account deductions from earnings. For
comparison, Illinois increased its gross income eUgibility limit to the poverty level even
tou^ Illinois is a lower cost state.^ In addition, Massachusetts' income disregards are
substantially less generous than many other states.' Massachusetts disregards $120 and
one-half of the remainder for families subject to the time limit and $120 and one-third of
the remainder for famihes not subject to tihe time limit. Illinois, for example, disregards
two-thirds of income for all famihes.
The percentage of the Massachusetts caseload that has earnings has increased
significantly, from 7.8% in state FY 95 (according to the DTA FY 1998 Spending Plan) to
14.4% currently. Despite this increase, the percentage of the caseload that has earnings is
still lower than in many other states that have improved treatment of earnings. For
example, in Illinois, 26% of famihes receiving assistance have earnings. In addition to the
less favorable treatment of earnings in Massachusetts as compared with Illinois, the
differences between the Massachusetts and Illinois percentages of the caseload with
earnings may also be partially attributable to a more easily understandable system and to
more successful efforts in Illinois to explain it. In Massachusetts, welfare workers have had
to e3q)lain the comphcated income disregard rules as only one of the myriad welfare
reform changes. Confusion is widespread regarding how earnings are treated, but if
famihes do not understand the income disregards then the disregards cannot operate as a
work incentive.
In order to determine whether improved treatment of earnings is having an impact
on the rate of case closings for earnings, additional information is needed about the
amounts of the famihes' earnings. This information should enable a researcher to
' John Bouman, Poverty Law Project, Chicago, Illinois (telephone call, April 24, 1998).
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determine whether or not a significant percentage of the cases with earnings would be
ineligible were it not for the improved treatment of earnings. However, it is worth noting
that Illinois, despite its much more higher percentage of the caseload with earnings, has
experienced no decline in the percentage of famihes that are working their way off welfare.
Thus, in Illinois, any reduction in case closings because families are able to continue to
receive assistance at earnings levels which previously would have made them ineligible is
apparently being offiset by the fact that more famihes are doing paid work and achieving
earning enough to exceed the increased eligibiUty levels. Improved treatment of earnings,
if properly implemented, need not result in a reduction in closings due to earnings.
Finally, although the percentage of Massachusetts' recipients with earnings is less
than in other states that have improved treatment of earnings, the increase fi^om 7.8% to
14.4% is nevertheless a significant and positive change. Unfortunately, under the state's
two-year time limit, even those families yvho are employed will lose all benefits at the two-
year point Thus, the time limit policy will cut ofif those families who have responded to
improved treatment of earnings as the law intended, and v/ho have received only partial
benefits because of their employment We can expect the percentage of the caseload with
earnings to drop once time limits hit, as families are forced off welfare despite low
earnings.
7

APPENDK: LISTING OF CLUSTERED CATEGORIES
MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: CXTTOBER 1993-AUGUST 1997 May 15. 1998

Ousters and Their Actions Codes
CLUSTER NUMBER ACTION CODE NUMBER AND REASON
Cluster I: Increased Income
N=23,056 (24%)
a. Earned income N= 18,596 (19%) Code 60: Case closed due to loss of S30 and/or 1/3 disregard.
Code 61: Case closed due to earnings.
b. Income from another £unily member Code 92: Case closed, counting income of minor parents or minor
parent
c. Excess assets Code 31: Case closed due to assets in excess of program limits.
Code 72: Case closed, client received lump sum income.
Q. uncsTiicu mcoiiic K^oue zj. \.^sk or nousenoiQ meuioer cioscu aue lo reccipi oi oox.
Code 30: Case closed due to unearned income in excess of
program limits.
Code 33: Case or household member closed due to
eligibility for, or receipt of, another benefit.
Cluster H: Sanctions N=36,775 (39%)
a. Non-compliance with behavioral
requirement
N=5,560 (6%)
Code 34: Case or household member closed, client refuses to
apply for other potential benefit or resource.
Code 73: Case or household closed, failed to participate in ESP
without good cause (1st time - 3 mos disqualification).
Code 79: Case or household member closed, teen parent in home
no longer meeting the requirement that a teen parent or a pregnant teen
must either have a high school diploma or be attending school or a
GED program.
Code 81: Case or household member closed, client foiled to
participate in ESP without good cause (second time).
Code 87: Case or household member closed, failure to meet
roquircmciii uuii a iccu poicoi musi iivc wiui aii ouiui
relative, legal guardian or in an available teen structured
program.
Code 95: Case or household member closed, failure to meet school
attendance (Leamfare) requirements.
b. Non-compliance with procedural
requirement
N=31,215 (33%)
Code 28: Case closed, household member failed to
cooperate without good cause in the disability
determination process to decide ifyou meet the (T)AF£>C
deprivation factor for incapacity.
Code 39: Case closed, did not provide income and/or asset
verification.
Code 40: Case or household member closed, did not provide
required verification(s).
Code 41: Case closed due to failure to keep an eligibility review
appointment or to return eligibility review form.
Code 42: Case closed, client refuses to con:q)ly with
lien/assignment provisions.
Code 58: Case closed, did not cooperate with Quality Control.
Code 59: Case closed due to failure to correct an incomplete
Mnnthlv Rennrt
Code 64: Case or household member closed, client did not verify
SSN or application for SSN.
Code 67: Case closed, failure to return a complete Monthly
Report
b. Non-compliance with procedural
requirement con't.
Code 71: Case closed due to &ilure to correct an inadequate
Monthly Report.
i-AKie /H . \.,asc or uouscuoiu mcuiDcr ciosco, lauuic lo ooc^jcihic
with direct deposit requirements.
Code 86: Case closed, failure to schedule an eligibility review at
end of disqualification period.
Cluster m: Eligible Persons Moved
N=8,013 (8%)
Code 43: Household member closed, child in temporary custody
ofDSS or other agency and grantee no longer exercises care and control
over child. Case or household member dosed, an eligible household
member is no longer in the home (adult member).
Code 47: Case or household member closed, an eUgible dependent
child(ren) is no longer in the home.
Code 48: Case or household member closed, no longer a
Massachusetts resident
Code 50: Case or household member closed, whereabouts
unknown - no mail returned (10 notice required).
Code 54: Case or household member closed, whereabouts
unknown - mail returned. (No 10 days notice required).
Cluster IV: Fraud N=428 (0.5%) Code 77: Case closed due to a bank match that revealed
imreported assets in excess ofprogram limits.
Code 83: Case closed, case identified as receiving assistance in
another state (result of interstate match).
Code 89: C^ase or household member disqualified for Intentional
Program Violation (Central OfiQce Recoiq)ment Unit use
only).
Code 98: Case denied; BSI determines applicant fraudulent;
result of fiont end detectioiL
Clustery: Client Request
IN— 14,JOO (IJ/o)
Code 38: Case or household meniber closed at the written request
oi ciieni lo lermuiaie aii caiegoncai uenenis ^casn, looa
stamps, MA and Medicare payments).
Code 76: Case closed, written request of client to slop cash
benefits only.
Cluster VI: No Longer Eligible
N=2,030 (2%)
Code 35: Case is closed, dependent child has both parents living
in the home and no deprivation factor.
Code 36: Case closed, feilure to meet program rules of eligibility;
ineligible for TAFDC for reason other than not meeting
work history requirement
Code 37: Case closed, disability eiqtecied to last fewer than 60
days. Case or household member closed, client no longer has health
problem keeping him or her from working, or caring for a child.
Code 44: Case or household member closed, a household member
does not meet the citizenship or noncitizen status rules for the program
Code 62: Case or dependent child(ren) age 18 or 19 closed,
child(ren) does not meet age and/or school attendance
requirements.
Code 63: Case or household member closed. No longer pregnant
MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993.AUGUST 1997 May IS. 1998
Cluster Vn: Other or Multiple Meanings
N= 10,986 (12%)
Code 23: (i) Case closed, required by the (T)AFDC rules to be
included in another assistance unit (ii) Case closed due to
income or assets of the person receiving care in excess of
I»ogram limits.
Code 24: (i) Case closed, due to suiqwrt p^ments in excess of
program limits, (ii) Case dosed, eligible for
unenq>loyment compensation.
Code 26: (i) Case closed, failed to appear for scheduled transition
eligibility review, (ii) Case closed, counting income and assets of
parents or qxNise.
Code 32: (i) Case closed, dependent no longer meets age rules or
is out of home. Use of this code is valid in any month of the 12-month
extension, (ii) Case closed, due to an asset transfer.
Code 45: (i) Case closed, became a resident of a public or private
institution, (ii) Case closed. Disability Review Unit
determined that you and/or a household member do not meet the
disability requirements of the program, (iii) Case closed, you do not
meet the disability requirement ofthe program.
Code 46: (i) PAFS closed - required to get Food Stamps (FS) in
another FS case, (ii) Case or household member closed,
client has been living in a mental health institution for
more than 60 days, (iii) Case closed, household member will begin
receiving FS in another FS case.
Code 49: Case closed due to death.
Code 51: (i) Case closed, &ilure to conq>lete a fiunily cap
eligibility review, (ii) Case closed, failure to meet
program rules for eligibility, ineligibility for AFDC for
reason other than not meeting relationship.
Code 53: (i) Case closed due to striker, (ii) Case closed, no longer
participating in M.C.
Code 55: (i) Case closed due to earnings. Case eligible for RRP
extended medical benefits, (ii) Case closed, you and/or a
household member are not enrolled in school or a GED
program and do not meet the teen living arrangement
requirements of living with a parent, another responsible
adult relative or in a teen structured living program, (iii) Case closed,
household member does not meet this program's rules for eligibility as a
student because he or she is not regularly attending high school fiill-
time.
Co<k 57: (i) Case closed, the Disability Review Unit has
determined that you and/or a household member do not have a physical
and/or mental impairment that affects your ability to woik. (ii) Case
closed, your recent Medical Report states that you do not have a
physical and/or mental inq)airment that affects your ability to
work, (iii) Case or household member closed, client is a
boarder, or a resident ofa commercial boarding house, or
Uving in a half-way house not licensed by the state, (iv) Case dosed,
caretaker relative had no earnings in one or more months of the
quarteriy reporting period.
Code 65: (i) (T)AFDC unit closed due to a combination of
earnings and siq)port payments in excess ofprogram limits, (ii) Case or
household member closed, client is in jail, (iii) Clase or household
member dosed, client did not meet FS woik registration requirements.
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Cluster Vn: Other or Multiple Meanings
con't
Code 66: (i) Grantee closed due to fiailure to cooperate with the
Child Support Enforcement Unit, (ii) Case denied, your Medical Report
was not con4>leted within 30 days of its being filed within the
Department
Code 88: (i) Grantees closed, £ulure to meet immunization
Requirements, (ii) Case closed, your most recent Medical
Report was based on an examination done over 30 days
before the Medical Rqwrt was completed.
Code 90: (i) Case closed due to counting the income or assets of
dependent children and their parents, (ii) Optional Assistance unit
closed.
Code 91: Disqualification period over (Central Office Recoupment Unit
use only).
Code 94: (i) Case or household members closed because of
institutionalization, including incarceration, (ii) Case closed, your
Medical Report was not con:q}leted within 30 d^ of its being filed
with the Dq)artmenL
Code 96: (i) Food Stamp portion of SSI case closed, (ii)
Household member closed. (Used only when 1 or more
household members have left the home or when no other
action reason is appropriate.) (iii) Case or household
member closed, while a fleeing felon, (iv) Case or
household member closed due to being a drug felon, (v)
Case or household member closed due to multiple
cash/food stamp benefit/plication, (vi) Grantee, legally
liable for siq^rt, or household member closed due to a reason other
than intentional program violation or TAFE>C program sanction.
Code 97: (i) Case or household member closed, client failed to
participate in ESP without good cause (third and subsequent time), (ii)
Case closed, you and/or a household member £ailed to provide a
completed disability supplement (iii) Case or household member
closed, failure to comply with the Food Stamp Employment and
Training Program requirements without good cause (3rd time - 12 mos
disqualification).
Code 99: Change due to the replacement of existing facsimile or
Social security number by a new or corrected social security number.
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